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PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES 
IN EAST ASIA 
Tony Makin 
The early 1970s breakdown of the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem of fixed exchange rates marked the last momentous change in the evolu- 
tion of the international monetary system, producing the heterogeneous array 
of exchange rate arrangements that now operates. Yet, equally important in 
the development of global finance has been the massive growth in the volume 
of international capital flows since then. This growth is mostly due to the 
dismantling of the broad range of exchange controls previously put in place 
to facilitate exchange rate management by central banks under the surveil- 
lance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Though exchange controls have been progressively dismantled since the 
early 1970s, their removal in emerging economies was accelerated signifi- 
cantly in the early 1990s, according to an index of capital controls devised by 
the IMF.1 Institutional investors in advanced economies increasingly became 
more aware of opportunities to diversify portfolios through the 1990s and 
more internationalized banks were readier to lend in emerging markets.2 By 
the mid-1990s, emerging economies were absorbing 40% of global foreign 
direct investment compared with 15% in 1990 and received 30% of global 
portfolio equity flows, as against only 2% at the beginning of the decade.3 
The presumption that international merchandise trade was to be en- 
couraged after the war through a supranational institution like the General 
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1. International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook: Interim Assessment (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: IMF, December 1997), p. 242. 
2. The emerging economies comprise a culturally and geographically diverse group of debtor 
countries that includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Tur- 
key, and Venezuela. 
3. World Bank, Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Road to Financial Inte- 
gration (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 9. 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 
predecessor, did not extend beyond trade in goods to include freer interna- 
tional trade in savings or financial services. Indeed, there was widespread 
antipathy toward free international capital movements at the time, as reflected 
for instance in a statement by John Maynard Keynes, an architect of the Bret- 
ton Woods monetary system, that "nothing is more certain than that the 
movement of capital funds must be regulated."4 Interestingly, the IMF now 
actively promotes capital account liberalization for member economies, in 
contrast to its Bretton Woods-era policy of sanctioning the earlier wide-rang- 
ing measures that restricted international capital flows. 
In theory, greater international capital market integration can confer econ- 
omy-wide benefits on advanced and emerging economies alike. For instance, 
international capital flows (see Figure 1 and Table 1) supplement domestic 
savings in recipient economies and allow more investment in regions where 
profitability is higher while simultaneously enabling savers in international 
creditor economies to gain from higher returns and portfolio diversification. 
However, at the same time it can increase the vulnerability of host economies 
to sharp capital flow reversals of the magnitude witnessed in East Asia and 
other emerging economies in the late 1990s. In those countries worst af- 
fected, this caused great social misery and political upheaval. The many 
households that had attained middle-class status through the overall rise in 
pre-crisis prosperity had their income and wealth slashed back to poverty 
levels. Political violence in Indonesia precipitated a change in leadership and 
Malaysia has remained unsettled politically. In light of the social, political, 
and economic disruption that capital reversals can cause in the short term, it 
is not surprising that the earlier Keynesian-inspired aversion to highly mobile 
capital has resurfaced through calls for the reimposition of Bretton Woods- 
style capital controls for emerging economies.5 
Contemporary advocates of capital controls stress the differences between 
free financial flows and free trade in goods and services. These differences 
include the far greater volatility of financial asset prices compared to prices 
of goods and services, problems related to information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, and poor bank management. As a result, economists 
such as Bhagwati6 maintain that the apparent costs of allowing international 
capital mobility outweigh the benefits. 
4. John Maynard Keynes, "The Origins of the Clearing Union" in The Collected Writings of J 
M Keynes, 25 (London: Macmillan for The Royal Economic Society, 1941), p. 23. 
5. See, for instance, Paul Krugman, "The Confidence Game," New Republic, October 5, 1998; 
and Robert Wade, "The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-?: Causes and Conse- 
quences," World Development 26:8 (August 1998). 
6. Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dol- 
lars," Foreign Affairs 77:3 (May/June 1998). 
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FIGURE 1 Capital Flows by Region (US$billion) 
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SOURCE: lIME, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Key Policy Is- 
sues (Washington, D.C.: IME, September 1998), p. 13. 
TABLE 1 Capital Flows to All Emerging Markets Annual Averages 
(US$billion) 
1977-82 1983-89 1990-94 1995 1996 1997 
Total net capital inflows 30.5 8.8 120.8 192.0 240.8 173.7 
Net foreign direct investment 11.2 13.3 46.2 96.0 114.9 138.2 
Net portfolio investment -10.5 6.5 61.1 23.5 49.7 42.9 
Other1 29.8 -11.0 13.5 72.5 76.2 -7.3 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (lIME), International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects and Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: lIME, 1995), p. 33, and (ibid., 1998), p. 13. 
1 Includes bank lending; 1977-89 figures exclude economies in transition and some Middle East- 
ern emerging markets. 
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Against such a view, this article argues that there is a strong theoretical 
case for free international trade in saving, provided a sound institutional 
framework exists for channeling foreign savings to ultimate borrowers in 
emerging economies. That is, it contends that what makes many emerging 
economies more prone to macroeconomically debilitating financial crises is 
not excessively mobile international funds, but relatively poorly developed 
domestic banking and financial systems. As a corollary, it suggests that 
reimposing capital controls, such as those implemented by the Malaysian 
government in late 1998, is an inappropriate response to the financial turmoil 
experienced in East Asia and could prove costly to long-term development. 
In advancing this view, I first highlight the economic benefits that liberal 
international capital markets can bestow on economies, as well as the key 
factors that precipitate capital flight in emerging economies. A straightfor- 
ward analogy is then proposed to clarify some of the main international pub- 
lic policy issues involved. I conclude that international capital movements 
can usefully signal the need for necessary economic and financial policy re- 
forms in emerging economies. 
The Role of Capital Flows in 
Emerging Economies 
Private capital inflows have tended to raise current account deficits, reduce 
domestic interest rates, and raise aggregate investment rates in host econo- 
mies. To the extent that the higher current account deficits that match in- 
creased capital inflows (see Figure 2 and Table 2) reflect an excess of 
domestic investment over domestic saving, the external deficits themselves 
should not be considered problematic, in and of themselves. Indeed, external 
imbalances can simply be interpreted as manifestations of increased interna- 
tional trade in savings that can contribute to higher world income growth. 
Host economies benefit because their capital stocks expand through extra 
investment that enables more production, whereas foreign investors gain to 
the extent that they can earn higher returns than in their home markets. 
Moreover, through international portfolio diversification, such institutional 
investors as pension, superannuation, and mutual funds are in principle able 
to reduce overall volatility of portfolio returns to the extent that movements 
in national share market prices are unsynchronized. 
Exchange Rate Risk 
At the same time however, international investment in financial assets is es- 
pecially sensitive to changes in investors' expectations, including expected 
exchange rate devaluations that can spark massive capital outflows. Indeed, 
in financial crises, changes in investors' exchange rate expectations become 
self-fulfilling. Investors expecting a future currency collapse will rush to sell 
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FIGURE 2 Emerging Asian Economies: Balance of Payments (US$billion) 
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SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: IMF, May 1998), p. 41. 
TABLE 2 Emerging Asian Economies: External Financing (US$billion) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Net external financing 26.4 32.6 31.5 39.5 52.4 59.4 63.4 23.5 -6.0 
Nondebt flows 8.0 9.6 10.9 11.3 11.6 14.3 19.5 18.5 12.7 
IMF loans -1.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 5.7 
Other borrowing 19.3 22.8 20.5 28.1 20.4 45.3 44.3 -0.7 -24.2 
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1998), p. 196. 
financial instruments denominated in that currency to avoid capital losses. 
Accordingly, the severe contraction in demand for the currency can put offi- 
cial exchange rates under intolerable pressure, depleting foreign exchange 
reserves of central banks and perhaps pushing up short-term interest rates in 
the process. 
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In the East Asian case, foreign investors had initially misjudged the extent 
of exchange rate risk by effectively presuming that many Asian central banks 
were bearing the foreign exchange rate risk through maintaining pegged ex- 
change rates. For instance, in the decades preceding the Asian crisis, the 
central banks of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
had provided domestic borrowers and foreign lenders alike a measure of ex- 
change rate certainty as these economies had adhered to fixed exchange rates 
or had strictly limited exchange rate flexibility. As a result, capital flows 
responded strongly to interest rate differentials and foreign borrowings re- 
mained unhedged against the possibility of large currency depreciations. 
The Role of the IMF 
Government ownership of many Asian banks signaled an implicit govern- 
ment guarantee against loan default. This encouraged foreign lenders to un- 
derstate the default risk, thus creating the "moral hazard" problem of too 
much borrowing and lending in the first instance. From the foreign lending 
side, there was another moral hazard effect that arose from the expectation 
that the IMF might bail out creditors in the event of possible default action. 
By intervening during financial crises, the IMF effectively acts as an interna- 
tional lender of last resort in arranging bridging finance at highly conces- 
sional rates so as to ease external debt servicing burdens and prevent possible 
default.7 
Other criticisms have also been leveled at the IMF about macroeconomic 
policies it prescribes during episodes of financial distress.8 For instance, it 
has been argued that the standard IMF condition for providing financial 
assistance is a sharp tightening of monetary and fiscal policies. However, 
these policies are often necessary to avoid a downward spiral of depreciation 
and inflation that would ultimately be counterproductive in assisting recov- 
ery. In the East Asian case, it has generally been the case that those econo- 
mies that did tighten macroeconomic policies as recommended by the IMF 
managed to avoid sustained inflation. 
Another criticism of IMF bailouts is that they may encourage excessive 
international borrowing and lending activity and reinforce the problem of 
moral hazard. This is because the default risks associated with such activity 
may be underestimated if the IMF is automatically assumed to provide finan- 
cial assistance in the event of future such crises. It is argued that IMF bail- 
7. The value of loans pledged to the IMF by member countries for this purpose in 1998 for 
Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea exceeded US$100 billion. Funds are to be raised as neces- 
sary from numerous sources, mostly from Japan and the U.S. 
8. Feldstein and Sachs criticize the role of the IMF and the nature of its policy responses to 
financial crises. See Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IMF," Foreign Afftirs 77:2 (March/April 
1998); and Jeffrey Sachs, "The IMF and the Asian Flu," American Prospect 20:10 (1998). 
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out assistance effectively subsidizes those foreign lenders with longer-term 
loans who are unable to liquidate their assets quickly and would otherwise 
have lost funds through default action. Moreover, loan default would teach 
financial institutions such as banks and mutual funds operating globally to 
assess the fundamentals of foreign economies more carefully before rushing 
to judgement with their funds. 
Against these views and in defense of IMF actions, it may be argued that 
the IMF, in conjunction with the World Bank, does have a useful role to play 
in advising on ways that emerging economies can best reform their banking 
and financial systems. This important sector of many emerging economies 
has been fragile for a number of reasons. 
Financial Sector Problems 
Prudential supervision of domestic banks-the institutions that channel the 
bulk of foreign lending in emerging markets-has in general been weak and 
nonsystematic. In particular, banks in many emerging economies have been 
established with inadequate capitalization and accumulated high levels of for- 
eign debt without adequate hedging against foreign exchange risk. There was 
also a lack of effective competition within the local financial systems of 
emerging economies that allowed locally run institutions to charge high inter- 
est rates to domestic borrowers, which in turn encouraged further foreign 
borrowing (see Table 3).9 
Information on the extent of nonperforming loans and the nature of the 
linkages between governments and business concerns was also limited. This 
lack of transparency for some time obscured the nature of the underlying 
structural problems of the financial institutions in East Asian economies, but 
foreign investors quickly switched to relatively safer investment alternatives 
elsewhere in the world upon realizing that emerging markets seemed inher- 
ently riskier than previously judged. 
The reversal of capital inflow to East Asia and other emerging markets that 
began midway through 1997 happened after foreign investors sold off East 
Asian financial assets on a large scale upon realizing that their funds were at 
greater risk than had been believed. Yet, the substantial financial asset di- 
vestment by foreign investors, including the large, U.S.-based hedge funds, 
was not the only factor that generated the subsequent crisis. In addition, the 
panic withdrawal by resident East Asian investors of their own funds from 
9. Goldstein and the IMF further detail institutional weaknesses in the Asian financial sector. 
See Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systemic Implications, 
Policy Analyses in International Economics, no. 55 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1998);. and IMF, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Key 
Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: IMF, November 1997). 
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TABLE 3 International Bank Lending to Five Asian Economies at End 1996 
(US$billion) 
Japanese European Total International 
U.S. Banks Banks Union Banks Lending 
Indonesia 5.3 22.0 21.0 55.5 
Korea 9.4 24.3 33.8 100.0 
Malaysia 2.3 8.2 9.2 22.2 
Philippines 3.9 1.6 6.3 13.3 
Thailand 5.0 37.5 19.2 70.2 
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Annual Report (Basel: BIS, 1998), p. 84. 
local financial institutions converted a sharp correction of financial asset 
prices into the major financial crisis that followed. 
An Analogy 
The turbulence in the financial markets of emerging economies in the wake 
of the Asian crisis has revived demands for restrictions on the volume of 
international capital flows. This international public policy prescription is, 
however, essentially at odds with the economic proposition that foreign sav- 
ings contributes positively to economic development. In what follows, an 
analogy is therefore developed to suggest why restoring capital or exchange 
controls is an ill-advised means of improving long-term economic welfare in 
emerging economies. 
According to the standard theory of economic growth, savings acts like a 
vehicle carrying an economy from one stage of development to another. 
However, though not explicitly recognized in the traditional neoclassical 
model of economic growth, savings may come from both domestic and for- 
eign sources. To get to the destination of higher national income, domestic 
and foreign funds flow through an emerging economy's financial system. In 
East Asia's case, locally owned and controlled banks were mainly responsi- 
ble for intermediating the flow of domestic and foreign savings to ultimate 
borrowers. Hence, the banking system itself can be thought of as playing a 
role similar to a road or highway. The sounder the road, the safer the journey 
and the lower the chance of accidents. 
This vehicle-destination-highway analogy can be used to compare ways of 
minimizing occasional crises, or accidents, that economies may have along 
the route to higher economic growth. Of course, road transport is not the 
only means of reaching a desired destination, just as domestic and foreign 
savings is not the only factor that contributes to higher national income. For 
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instance, improved human capital or greater liberalization of trade in goods 
and services also assist development, just as air and rail transport provide 
complementary modes of getting from one place to another. 
One option for reducing the number of accidents on highways is to prohibit 
imported vehicles, thus reducing the overall flow of road traffic. This option 
has been adopted by Malaysia and advocated by numerous economists.10 
Relatedly, Chile's example of restricting inflows is often cited as an example 
for other emerging economies to follow. In the past, the Chilean monetary 
authorities have required that a portion of external borrowings be deposited at 
the central bank without interest. This has meant higher short-term interest 
rates than necessary. Continuing the analogy, although such means of limit- 
ing road traffic would minimize road accident risk, it is also likely, however, 
to mean that fewer passengers can reach their desired destination, implying 
that the option is not the first best public policy response. 
A slightly different crisis minimization option is to tax the use of imported 
vehicles differentially. Relatedly, a so-called "Tobin tax," originally es- 
poused by James Tobin of Yale University, would apply to foreign currency 
conversions arising from short-term capital flows worldwide." Yet, this op- 
tion is also likely to have adverse implications for short-term domestic inter- 
est rates and hence development. Moreover, such a tax would be difficult to 
implement in practice and avoidance problems would arise if some econo- 
mies refused to participate. 
Continuing the analogy, it would seem that the best way to minimize road 
accidents, while simultaneously allowing as much travel as possible, is to 
upgrade the highway to make travel safer and at the same time ensure there is 
surveillance of traffic flows to detect instances of reckless driving. With ref- 
erence to the Asian economies and their financial systems, crisis prevention 
would therefore be best achieved through major reform of banking practices 
in the region. More information about economic conditions and improved 
transparency of financial dealings could prevent future crises, just as advisory 
signs on highways make road travel safer (see Table 4). Arms-length pruden- 
tial authorities could also perform a surveillance role by policing the capital 
adequacy ratios of banks to ensure that financial speed limits are not ex- 
ceeded. Such fundamental reforms of financial practices in these economies 
obviously need to be firmly in place and recognized as such by foreign inves- 
10. See, for instance, Bhagwati, "The Capital Myth"; Krugman, "The Confidence Game"; 
Wade, "The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis"; and Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The 
Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model vs. the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex," New Left Re- 
view, March-April 1998. 
11. See James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Eastern Economic 
Journal 4 (July/October 1978). 
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TABLE 4 Sovereign Credit Ratings of Five Asian Economies, July 1999 
Long-Term Bonds Long-Term Bank Deposits 
Indonesia B3 Ca 
Korea Baa3 Ba2 
Malaysia Baa3 Bal 
Philippines Bal Ba2 
Thailand Bal Bi1 
SOURCE: Moody's Investors Service, on the Internet at <http://www.moodys.com/>. 
tors, including international banks, before substantial capital flows return to 
the region. 
Concluding Comments 
The general finding of international trade theory that free trade in goods en- 
hances economic welfare has strong support from international economists 
and international institutions such as the WTO, whose very brief is to ad- 
vance trade liberalization. Large trading blocs, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum, have been established for the purpose of encouraging 
greater cross-border trade in goods and services by dismantling impediments 
to trade, such as import tariffs. 
Although the WTO has also been pursuing international agreement on ex- 
panding trade in financial services, the idea that international trade in savings 
similarly confers mutual welfare gains on contracting parties is neither as 
widely recognized nor accepted.12 Yet, allowing international capital to flow 
freely can improve economic welfare in emerging economies for it frees 
those economies from the constraint of their own savings levels. In this way, 
foreign savings can complement domestic savings and play an important role 
in the process of economic growth, for it permits domestic capital accumula- 
tion to be higher than otherwise. Meanwhile, the national income of creditor 
countries may rise to the extent that international enders earn higher returns 
than otherwise. 
The main qualification to the argument about the benefits of allowing un- 
restricted flows of funds across borders is that reversals of inflows make 
emerging economies vulnerable to crises. Capital flight in response to new 
information about exchange rate risk, default risk, or deteriorating fiscal and 
monetary policy settings can impose substantial, short-term economic, social, 
12. The OECD has also sought to further liberalize foreign investment activities through its 
attempts to reach consensus on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 
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and political costs on emerging economies. These costs are transmitted in the 
first instance through higher domestic interest rates and lost output, as well as 
through large exchange rate depreciations and the associated higher inflation. 
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that any sharp re-direction of interna- 
tional investment funds in emerging economies provides a strong signal to 
domestic policy makers that further growth-enhancing reform is necessary. It 
is here that the IMF and the World Bank can play useful roles in advising on 
and facilitating the most appropriate reforms. The challenge of course is to 
convince domestic economic authorities to strengthen their institutional 
frameworks by forfeiting long-established practices that have resulted from 
sectional interest group pressures. 
In summary, the recent financial crises in East Asia and other emerging 
economies have exposed major structural weaknesses in their domestic bank- 
ing and financial systems, which have acted as the major conduits of foreign 
saving. More specifically, these crises have underscored the need for a more 
robust system of bank supervision in line with international standards, for 
example, one consistent with the principles of prudent banking recommended 
by the Bank for International Settlements. With a sounder financial infra- 
structure, appropriately monitored to prevent reckless lending, foreign sav- 
ings can continue to contribute positively to economic growth in emerging 
economies. 
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